You [ Military professionals ] must cognize something about scheme and tactics and logistics. but besides economic sciences and political relations and diplomatic negotiations and history. You must cognize everything you can cognize about military power. and you must besides understand the bounds of military power. You must understand that few of the of import jobs of our clip have in the concluding analysis. been solved by military power alone–John F. Kennedy ( Quoted from “Winning the Peace the Requirement for Full-spectrum Operations” by Chiarelli and Michaelis ( 2005 ) . Military history-just like any other signifier of history- can do or interrupt you depending on how you use it.

In US. for illustration. military conflicts and wars can be traced back to the 1700s when America was in the brink of achieving independency. From so onwards. there have been a series of wars-mainly in their conquering and colonisation attempts. In other parts of the universe. military history besides faced variable developments that led to the use of different signifiers and schemes. All these wars can nevertheless be jointly summarized with the first and 2nd universe wars which saw direct or indirect engagement of about all states from all over the universe ( Gabel. 1985. p. 1-85 ) .

It is from analyzing such rich history that current military professionals are able to hold a comparatively easy clip when traveling about their critical agendas. These lessons can be in signifier of doing betterments on already discovered cardinal constructs or instead. larning from past errors by avoiding them. Failure to positively larn comes with a bag-full of effects ; more competently put in the words of John Santayana “Those who do non cognize history are doomed to reiterate it. ”

In giving his part to this immensely debated topic. RAF ( 2010. p. 152 ) rhetorically asks that “If the survey of history is so fraught with jobs. and either so easy to acquire incorrect or hard to acquire right. depending on one’s position of the contents of the glass. why fuss at all? ” Well. so many answers-backed with evidences-have been advanced to back up both terminals of the argument. However. the focal point of this paper is traveling to be on cagily foregrounding the importance of analyzing military history-which most research workers amass as being vital-while partially foregrounding its demerits.

Before diging deep into why we should or should non analyze military history. it is built-in that we start by adverting the importance of history as an entity in itself. It is from acquiring this background knowledge that we will be able to ardently turn to the issue of military history. Most bookmans tend to to a great extent pull their cognition from historical informations ; so they strongly commend the survey of history in general. Others. on the other manus. either oppose it or back up saving usage of historical beginnings.

To the latter. history-more so the written type-is topic to people’s readings. apprehensions and sentiments therefore may be misdirecting in surveies since it is non really accurate or dependable ( RAF. 2010. p. 153 ) . For illustration. Presher ( 1901 ) describes his positions on America’s maltreatment of noncombatants in a Filipino small town. To some historiographers. the maltreatment described here was non truly mistreat but merely an exercising of power. Both positions might hence be really confusing to people seeking to acquire the existent image of what happened during that clip. Harmonizing to RAF ( 2010. p. 153 ) . the literature studied in history “Is necessarily extended and. about every bit necessarily. much of it is impenetrable on first review.

” This may besides divert from what is truly meant. RAF goes in front and advises that if we are to acquire the most accurate and precise representation of what happened. we need to analyze “In comprehensiveness. deepness and arguably most significantly in a proper context. ” We should besides guarantee that we focus on many beginnings from important persons so as to acquire facts instead than myths or fabrications which might be misdirecting ( P.

152-156 ) . For case. The long shadow of small stone is a personal memoir of Daisy Bates which makes the writing reliable and believable as opposed to other military history records which are narrated from the position of rumors. Just like any major country of human concern. the survey of military history has its predefined linguistic communication and constructs. Consequently. when analyzing military history. it is built-in that you familiarise yourself with slangs used here.

For illustration. words like Strategic. operational. Tactical and Individual are used in military history to stand for the kingdom of traditional history ( Kagan ( 2006 ) . It is besides of import to observe that the surveies should be conducted in an order. Haphazard surveies tend to confound instead than execute the cardinal maps of analyzing military history. Having said that. what truly are the advantages of analyzing military history? Elementarily. RAF ( 2010. p. 157 ) paperss that military history surveies by military professionals offers amusement. inspiration. information and pride to its pupils.

Merely by analyzing about the adventures of our historical heroes and scoundrels in their military duties. we are able to acquire amusement since most of the narratives are shocking. On top of that. we get informed from the in-depth descriptions of the war times. In With the Old Breed. Sledge ( 2001 ) grippingly describes the awful experiences at Peleliu and Okinawa while informing the readers of how hard it was to last during that clip. In consequence. person analyzing the narrative gets informed and entertained at the same clip. Murray & A ; Sinnreich ( 2006. p. 32 ) assert that “Military history helps supply the theoretical foundation for the scientific discipline of war. and continues to make so even in an epoch of immense technological and societal alteration. ”

Gabel ( 1985. p. 3 ) exemplifies this by speaking of “clumsy. undependable. hard to operate” fight armored combat vehicles that provided a footing for the formation of better armored combat vehicles to be used in other wars. In another illustration to demo how one piece of history laid theoretical foundation for another. Lupfer ( 1981. p. 8 ) says that: The Germans did non win the First World War and their strategic behavior of the war was frequently flawed.

Yet. much value can be derived from their development of tactical philosophy. for the Germans developed and applied new tactical philosophy imposingly in 1917 and 1918. Their tactical alterations were systematic and thorough. for these alterations in philosophy straight affected subsequent battleground success. In add-on. analyzing military history provides a platform for citing by military professionals. Lupfer ( 1981. p. 8 ) articulates of alterations made by the ground forces of Germany courtesy of army’s high command—OHL. First. a defensive philosophy is adopted based on old surveies so subsequently. an violative scheme is adopted.

In the long tally. the German ground forces succeeds in controling their resistances in the western foreparts. Harmonizing to Hanson ( 2007 ) . military history besides plays the unreplaceable function of reminding us occurrences of the yesteryear and how the people back so contributed to our current province. The legion certifications of the conflicts in the 1700s aids us non merely to cognize the forfeits endure for the accomplishment of independency but besides reminds to be thankful and appreciative of all the scoundrels who paved the manner for the current freedoms in the U. S Furthermore. military preparations merely cover a little part of the cardinal facets involved in military instruction.

Most bookmans opinionate that military history helps in make fulling the cognition nothingness left by other signifiers of military instruction. Specifically. military history enhances practicableness of military instruction which is important for the growing of military professionals. Hanson ( 2007 ) adds that “Democratic citizenship requires cognition of war—and now. in the age of arms of mass obliteration. more than of all time.

” It is for this ground that establishments that focus on military history are slowly-but steadily- lifting in many states. This is besides apparent with the assorted films. shows and vocals that presently tend to integrate facets of military history. Examples include award-wining films like Troy and 300 among many others. In malice of being enormously debated by many research workers. Hanson-and a smattering of other scholars-further opinionate that military history Teachs us that war is non needfully every bit bad as most people perceive it to be.

So even though 1000000s of people may acquire killed or countless belongingss may acquire destroyed. through war. we may acquire peace. freedom or even come on economically which is positive. In other words. war involves making something bad with the hope that something good may come out of it. This can be exemplified with the results of the immensely covered World wars ( WWI and WWII ) ; despite the legion deceases and immense economic losingss that resulted from them. the wars besides pioneered duologue which led to freedom and peace amongst the involved provinces.

On the flipside. the survey of war does non needfully compare to advantages. Chiarelli and Michaelis ( 2005 ) support this statement by stating that “A gun on every street corner. although visually appealing. provides merely a short-run solution and does non compare to long-run security grounded in a democratic procedure. ” So in malice of peace being the ultimate mark for wars. many wars end up with worse competition therefore declining the already bad state of affairs.

In cases where peace or freedom was non realized from the war. pupils who study the war may stop up sucking in bad influence and negative lessons instead than the positive lessons that is targeted for them. It is besides of import to observe that some people who study military history may acquire private information on some confidential issues which may present a menace to those populating around them. An illustration is chemical combinations of doing a bomb landing in the custodies of a terrorist. This poses a danger non merely to people populating around the terrorist but besides on the state as a whole.

Yet still. the survey of military history can turn out rather dearly-won and hazardous. So many people presently focus on technological promotions. find of new drugs to work out the current diseases. doing work easier through package among other things. I consequence. really small clip and attending is given to analyzing of past histories. The fact that history can non be changed yet we can find what becomes of our hereafter makes even more people gutter the survey of history while concentrating on current personal businesss every bit good as prospective prognosiss.

As a consequence. those who concentrate on analyzing military history largely have to personally delve into their pockets so as to the surveies as opposed to the 1000000s of dollars donated daily towards new researches. In add-on. those who study military history have to sometimes come to footings with hapless cordial reception and ill will from their topics. In Dougherty’s ( 2005. p. 1 ) interview of historian and freelance author Robert Kaplan on his military research book Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground. Kaplan reveals that he had to drag soldiers through inhospitable and volatile countries merely to acquire an interview from them.

In his surveies. he visited Yemen. Iraq. Ethiopia and Philippines- who at the clip of the interviews were rather unwelcoming therefore doing it hard for him to acquire significant information. Dougherty ( 2005. p. 1 ) further exemplifies these pungent conditions by stating that in order for Kaplan to acquire valuable information from the soldiers. “He immerses himself in their universe. disbursement hebdomads and months populating with soldiers in their quarters. fall ining their missions. feeding. imbibing. perspiration. freeze. and sometimes hungering. side-by-side with them. ”

Adding on to the demerits. Kagan ( 2006 ) says that the complex nature of military linguistic communication which involves “Unit sizes and terminology. acronyms and abbreviations. typologies of military activity” may sometimes turn out excessively many-sided and confounding to normal pupils ( those without professional military cognition ) . Dougherty ( 2005. p. 3-6 ) gets Kaplan to speak about the complex linguistic communication that existed between the military sergeants. generals and commanding officers in their communicating. In some instances. it was even a must for the military functionaries to cognize and pass on in other foreign linguistic communications.

At such points. some significances possibly distorted to those entering every bit good as those analyzing the history based on the assorted communicating sentence structures and regulations that govern different parts. Last. the proliferation in ways of work outing differences has lessened the usage of military forces by most states. As of today. most differences are solved through duologues. tribunals and round-table dialogues by universe world powers. In consequence. the survey of military is merely done by a few people who seldom dig deep into these annals of history.

The many cardinal maps that military history provides are hence easy being corroded off by the of all time increasing modern signifiers of struggle declaration. In decision. it is notable to state that military history plays an of import function in fixing soldiers for wars. It may non needfully authorise them but it offers them penetrations on how their oppositions fight. their strengths. failings. antecedently successful combat methods. what they should avoid among other vital inside informations which are priceless before traveling to war.

On the other manus. military history should be used meagerly so as to avoid complacence by soldiers based on certitude. Competently put in the words of Henry Kissinger ( 1978 ) ; “History is non. of class. a cookery book offering pretested formulas. It teaches by analogy. non maxims. It can light the effects of actions in comparable state of affairss. yet each coevals must detect for itself what state of affairss are in fact comparable. ” References Bates. D. ( 1987 ) . T The long shadow of small stone.

Fayetteville. P. 1 – 5. 43 – 76. 82 – 106. [ 64 pages ] Chiarelli. P. W. . & A ; Michaelis. P. R. ( July-August. 2005 ) . Wining the peace: The demand for full-spectrum operations. Military Review. p. 1 – 17. Dougherty. E. ( 2005 ) . Warriors for Good: Interview with Robert Kaplan. Atlantic Unbound. Gabel. C. R. ( 1985 ) . Seek. work stoppage. and destroy: U. S. ground forces armored combat vehicle destroyer philosophy in World War II. Hanson. V. D. ( 2007 ) . Why survey war? CITY diary. Retrieved May 18. 2010. from hypertext transfer protocol: //www. city-journal. org/html/17_3_military_history. hypertext markup language Kagan. F. W. ( 2006 ) .

Why military history affairs. AEI Online. Retrieved May 18. 2010. from hypertext transfer protocol: //www. aei. org/outlook/24600 Kaplan. R. ( October. 2005 ) . Imperial Grunts: With the ground forces particular forces in the Philippines and Afghanistan—laboratories of pacification. The Atlantic Monthly. p. 84 – 93. Lupfer. T. T. ( 1981 ) . The kineticss of philosophy: the alteration in German tactical philosophy during the First World War. Murray. W. . & A ; Sinnreich R. H. ( 2006 ) .

The past as prologue: the importance of history to the military profession. Google Books. p. 32. Presher. F. ( 1999 ) . Private Frederick Presher describes the U. S. Army’s maltreatment of noncombatants in a Filipino small town. 1901. Major Problems in American Military History. p. 230 – 231. RAF. P. W. G. ( 2005 ) . Twelve. Why Study Military History? Defence Studies. 5 ( 1 ) . p. 151-164. Retrieved May 18. 2010. from hypertext transfer protocol: //dx. Department of the Interior. org/10. 1080/14702430500097408 Sledge. E. B. ( 1981 ) With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa. P. 55 – 10.